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The author of this piece, R. Michael Fisher, worked for over 30 years as an engineering project manager for the US Army Corps of Engineers, Chicago District. His speciality was shoreline civil works projects. Mr. Fisher is a registered professional engineer and has an M.A. in Civil Engineering (Nuclear) from the University of California at Berkeley. Mr. Fisher recently submitted this commentary to both Ms. Tranter and Ms. Roemer of the FOTP.
3/30/08
Lake Shore Drive Extension/Landfill Plan
Preliminary Comments
The Friends of the Park (FOTP) and their associates are currently advocating a plan generally to extend LakeShore Drive (first from Hollywood to Devon, then to the Evanston border), to fill in the lake with sediment and to create more parkland lakeward of the Drive extension) along the entire length of the extension (LSDX plan). On the one hand, this is a very interesting, exciting concept. On the other, the path to execution of this plan is lined with more briars, thorns and unexploded mines than most water resources plans, and the perceived carrot at the end of this perilous journey is small, emaciated, mildewed and moldy. In fact in my limited experience (decades as a Federal agency [currently retired] planning study manager specializing in Great Lakes development projects), I cannot recall hearing of any formally proposed water resources development (WRD) project with more negative impacts. Only two informally discussed WRD “plans” seem even in the same league as far as negative impacts are concerned – (1) the plan to dam up the Colorado River and flood the Grand Canyon; and (2) the plan to recharge the subsiding Ogallalla groundwater reservoir in Texas with piped in Great Lakes water (although both of those “projects” are of a much more massive scale than the proposed LSDX plan, and are different in nature).
A couple of points in particular caught my eye when reviewing some of the FOTP’s discussions of the proposed project. For one, they don’t have a clue as to what the project will cost, but want the locals to select the plan concept they most prefer (if any), and then they will attempt to determine the project cost. Talk about the cart before the horse! This is like asking a young man to select the car he wants, and when he selects the fancy red sports car with the black horse on the name plate, he becomes quite dismayed to find out the $5,000 in his bank account might almost cover one month’s car payment. This is extremely poor planning practice/leadership.
Another is their apparent mind-set that the entire Chicago shoreline should be in public parkland, and their pursuit of this lofty ideal as if they were seeking the Holy Grail. If I remember correctly, 24 of the 28 miles of Chicago shoreline are already dedicated to public parks. This an outstanding civic achievement as it stands, and is far greater than that of any other American city, large or small. If ½ a loaf is better than none, 90% of a loaf is far better than none. Nowhere is it Carved in Stone, or written in Gold Letters that “The Entire Chicago Shoreline Shalt be Acquired by the City and Preserved for All Eternity as Pristine Parkland!” (and cared for by the Friends of the Park). This borders on civic arrogance.
Need for Proposed Project
The most basic, primary test for any significant public development project (which will nearly always have some adverse, short-term impacts) is whether or not there is a real need for the project (If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!). If so, then the relative merits and demerits of the proposed project can then be considered, weighed and evaluated, and a decision can be made as to whether the plan is worth further consideration. This proposed project will not eliminate or reduce any dangers to life, safety or health; it will not provide any additional jobs (other than make-work, short-term planning/construction jobs) or otherwise stimulate the economy. All it may do is provide some marginal improvements to urban aesthetics, and recreation, and possibly to traffic flow, but even this is problematical. For the proposed LSDX project, it is difficult to see any significant need, and thus it fails this primary test
On a related matter, there has been some discussion of the relevance of this proposed project to the original Burnham Plan. The Burnham Plan was a well thought-out, idealized, conceptual plan for overall shoreland/park development along the Chicago shoreline put together about 100 years ago. A key point is that this plan was meant to be implemented on a basically undeveloped, natural shoreline. Many pieces of this plan were in fact implemented, primarily on the south and central shorelines of the City, when the money was available, or when a mutually beneficial deal could be struck with a wealthy contributor (i.e. the Illinois Central Railroad), or when the Lake proved to be a good dumping/fill location for residue from The Great Chicago Fire. Otherwise, the City was left to develop as social and economic conditions directed. The primary point for the present time is that there no longer exists any semblance of a natural, undeveloped shoreline along the reach for which this project is proposed, making the Burnham Plan for this shoreline reach entirely moot.
Another directly related matter is that the City of Chicago currently has far and away the greatest portion of its shoreline devoted to public park use than any other major, or even secondary, city. This is a very positive – the City fathers, the Chicago Park Commission and The Friends of the Park all merit well-deserved kudos for this pleasant fact. Many of these park facilities are well utilized throughout the summer months on week-ends and holidays. However, the fact remains that for 9-1/2 months of the year, nearly all shoreline parks are under-utilized, and even during the summer months, on week-days, most shoreline parks are under-utilized. Even on summer week-ends, many of the shoreline parks on the south side are not heavily used. There always comes a point of overkill, where even good things can be overdone. Many observers believe that this point has already been reached with Chicago shoreline parks. The situation is similar in Evanston.
Positive Benefits (without consideration of adverse impacts)
If somehow, the proposed project could be put in place without any adverse impacts to the existing community, or without any costs, there would be some positive benefits accruing to the project, primarily due to increased recreational access and to an increase in overall community aesthetics. These would probably not be great, owing to the existence of the already substantial shoreline park facilities throughout the City. There would probably also be some benefits due to decreased traffic flow times, but these might be partially offset by increased traffic drawn to the improved local transportation network. These would not be expected to be significant, owing to the relatively short (2 to 2-1/2 miles) length of improved traffic flow. It would take a detailed analysis to properly quantify each of these benefit categories.
Dis-Benefits (adverse impacts to existing development)
This is where the muck really hits the fan. To bring in many million tons of fill material to an open coastline on which to build a major, high-capacity highway, to extend the fill lakeward to create new land, and to successfully protect it from wave-induced erosion, would be a major undertaking along a totally pristine, undeveloped lakeshore. Implementation of such a project along a highly developed, densely populated major metropolitan shoreline, with 10’s of thousands of residents and a major university within ½ mile of the construction zone would result in orders of magnitude more adverse impacts than the same project along the undeveloped shore. Loss of direct access to the lakefront by the thousands of existing residents and by the university would be totally unacceptable. Political, legal and real estate issues stemming from this huge wave of dissatisfaction alone would be legion. Besides this, another huge wave of dissatisfaction would hit due to construction-related issues. Even though much of the fill and other construction-related material could (probably) be barged in, there would still need to be a significant level of truck traffic throughout the entire local region for an extended construction period. It is doubtful that the local residents, businesses and university community (as well as the local streets) would long tolerate these dislocations. There are almost certainly other potentially severe adverse impacts (including environmental impacts), but these are the ones that come most readily to mind. More will be said about these later in this comment document.
Net Benefits (Positive benefits less adverse benefits)
Without regard to project (planning, design, EIS, construction specifications, and construction) costs, which haven’t been forgotten, it seems clear to this observer that the adverse project impacts (and their resolution, if possible) will monetarily outweigh positive project benefits, resulting in negative net benefits. Unless this preliminary conclusion can be shown to be significantly in error, there really is no reason to further consider the project. A detailed analysis of all relevant benefit categories must be performed by competent engineers/economists.
Project Costs
Assuming that somehow the project can be shown to have positive net benefits, project costs must be thoroughly evaluated. In addition to construction and construction monitoring costs, this will include preliminary planning, detailed planning, EIS preparation, detailed design, and construction plans and specifications costs. Construction costs, in general, will include the cost of fill material, the cost of hauling and placing the fill, the cost of fill containment structures (probably steel sheet-pile), the cost of placing and driving the SSP, the cost of toe stone to prevent toe erosion of the SSP, the cost of construction of the roadway piles, the cost of roadway construction, the cost of constructing new roadway interconnections, and the cost of park development, as well as all real estate easement
costs and any required adverse environmental impact mitigation costs. These costs could easily run into hundreds of millions of dollars. Planning, EIS, and engineering & design costs, before a spadeful of earth is turned or a barge is unloaded, will probably run several million dollars. Unless it can be shown that net benefits, on an average annual basis, exceed average annual total costs, the project should not continue.
Project Time-Frame
Based on previous experience with somewhat similar projects, the total time frame from early planning studies to project completion should not be anticipated to be measured in years, but in decades. 25 years would probably be an optimistic assumption.
Political Issues
Such a project would necessarily require Federal and State permits and/or other approvals, even without any Federal or State funds involved. Due to the almost certain disapproval of the project by thousands of disaffected voters, it is nearly certain that protests to State and Federal legislators will be lodged, making this a politically unpopular project. That means, at minimum, little legislative pressure on State/Federal regulatory agencies to advance the project can probably be expected.
Legal Issues
If the project were to move forward, it is very likely that some of the same dissatisfied parties who contacted State/Federal legislators would also file suit in the courts to obtain some form of redress against real (or imagined) ills caused by project implementation. Even if plaintiffs were unsuccessful, fighting these suits would be another problem for project proponents.
Real Estate Issues
As this project will extend for some miles along a highly developed urban shoreline, there are probably scores of contiguous (current) riparian property owners who would feel adversely impacted by the project. Even if much construction is done on the water by barge mounted equipment, some shore-based construction areas will almost certainly be required. Given the likely unpopularity of the project among riparian property owners, it may prove extremely difficult to obtain required shoreland easements/access. If City/State eminent domain procedures are utilized, this would only increase the unpopularity of the project.
Environmental Issues
Even though there may not be any significant long-term adverse environmental impacts of the project, a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will have to be prepared. There will certainly be short-term adverse environmental impacts and long-term adverse social impacts. These must be addressed.
Federal Permits
As this project would involve substantial volumes of fill material added to the “waters of the United States”, a Corps of Engineers permit approving placement of this fill material would be required. The Corps is also responsible for keeping the surface of navigable water bodies free from hazards to navigation. Therefore, a second Corps permit would probably be required to comply with this matter. Due to the political unpopularity of this project, the Corps would very likely consider this project very carefully before granting either permit.
State Permits
The State of Illinois owns the bottom of the Lake upon which the fill would be placed. Therefore the State would have to give its permission to allow this project to proceed. The State also works jointly with the Corps in issuing permits to add fill material to waters of the State. Again, due to political unpopularity, it is problematical as to whether the State would allow the project to proceed.
Funding Sources
As discussed above, this project would almost certainly cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Potential funding sources would be Federal funds, State funds or some combination of City/County funds. Federal funds for such projects are nearly always funneled through the Corps of Engineers. At the present time, Corps policy does not permit recommendations for expenditure of Federal funds for park/recreational projects (although there was a time when the policy was different). Due to the probable political unpopularity of the project, it is unlikely that the Corps, as an agency, or Congressional interests are likely to go out of their normal patterns to try find any Federal funds for the project. The State has its own priorities, but nearly always is less able to fund major water resources development projects than is the Federal government. Due to higher priority projects and the likely political unpopularity of this project, the odds are high that the State would not fund more than a small portion of this project. The same can most likely be said for the City and/or the County. Any local tax increases to pay for this project would almost certainly be highly unpopular. Not only because all tax increases are unpopular, but more specifically because only a very small potion of the City/County residents would ever be likely to utilize this newly created parkland, and it would generate no revenue.
Coastal Engineering and Other Technical Issues
There is little doubt that such a project could be physically constructed – Engineers can design and construct a wide variety of projects, including those like the proposed LSDX project. The more important issue at this stage is determining whether the costs and other adverse impacts related to project construction are offset by project benefits. From a coastal engineering perspective, the proposed project should have little impact on littoral sediment movement (drift), mainly because there is so little of it moving into and along the Chicago shoreline, as previous analyses have shown. There is very little sediment moving along the entire shoreline of Illinois, due to the many man-made littoral barriers to such sediment transport. Only relatively small amounts of sand cross the Illinois-Wisconsin border, and what little there is, is trapped by the Illinois Beach State Park (IBSP) small-boat harbor. The small amounts of sediment transported past IBSP are completely blocked by the harbor structures at Waukegan and the old Great Lakes Naval Training Center. The minor amounts of sediment moving southward along the north shore communities are trapped by the many groins along this shoreline reach and by the larger structures at Wilmette Harbor and Northwestern University, and then by the many groins in Evanston. This leaves very little moving into the Chicago shoreline reach. However, whatever sediment would find its way into Chicago from Evanston, would almost certainly be diverted out into deeper waters, from which it would be unable to return to the shallower littoral zone.
The steel sheet-pile sea walls containing the fill material on which the new parks would be constructed would have to be protected from wave-generated erosion at the toe by an adequate amount of good quality toe stone.
On a tangentially related matter, it was written in a news article that Mike Chrzastowski stated that Lake Michigan levels may be expected to remain (for quite a spell, anyway) at significantly lower levels than here-to-fore experienced. I know Mike C. as a very capable, knowledgeable, helpful coastal researcher, and have a lot of respect for him, both professionally and personally. However, on this point I must take issue with him. There is no possible way he, or any scientific observer, can foresee future weather patterns (which ultimately are responsible for all Great Lakes water levels) to any meaningful degree, so I respectfully disagree with this opinion. It was barely 20 years ago when coastal researchers (and the media) were direly predicting long-term higher lake levels with significantly higher rates of shore erosion. No serious coastal observer believed that lake levels would drop as fast as they, in fact, did.
Studies Required
As discussed previously, before construction of the project could begin, necessary studies would include: preliminary planning studies; detailed planning studies; an Environmental Impact Statement; detailed engineering design studies; and plans & specifications. It cannot be stressed too strongly, that if project proponents are serious about going forward with this plan, a thorough, well-done planning study should be completed at the earliest possible time. This study should consider a moderate number of alternative plans (3 to 5), and without becoming too detailed, focus on coming up with good, ball-park estimates of all significant project positive benefits, all significant adverse impacts (primarily social and environ mental), and a reasonably accurate cost estimate (+/- 25%). This study should be prepared by a competent, experienced study team including: lead planner; coastal engineer; general design engineer; cost estimator; economist; environmental specialist; and real estate specialist. The economist and/or environmental specialist should also have some social impact planning skills. If such a study is done well, it should pretty well establish whether or not the proposed plan should be continued, and if so, lay out the framework and schedule for future studies and analyses.
These comments are very preliminary in nature, and have been prepared after a cursory review of the proposed project. If after further review of the proposed plan , some of these comments are found to be inaccurate or irrelevant, a secondary set of comments will be submitted.
R. Michael Fisher
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